I. INTRODUCTION
How can a judge undermine precedent while still following it? This Essay considers the methods by which Supreme Court Justices may weaken precedent without explicitly overruling cases by strategically adopting an approach to stare decisis that is less explicitly aggressive than their colleagues'.
Adding to the literature of "stealth overruling," this Essay considers examples of such methods from Chief Justice Roberts's first five years on the Supreme Court. These examples indicate that Chief Justice Roberts knows how to engage in stealth overruling and, more broadly, how to use his colleagues' preferences to maintain a formal commitment to judicial humility while achieving jurisprudential change. As such, they reveal important insights about how Justices can operate strategically to achieve their preferences within both the opportunities and the confines inherent in a multi-judge court.
After five years, many have accused the Roberts Court of aggressively attacking precedent. No less a figure than Justice O'Connor, whose retirement marked the effective start of that Court, has expressed concern about the Roberts Court's willingness to overrule prior decisions. ' Then-Judge Roberts's famous confirmation hearing analogy of judging to umpiring 2 and his professed respect for stare decisis 3 make for a dramatic narrative in which a nominee piously describes a humble role for judges but then, once safely confirmed, sets out with a wrecking ball.
The charge may have merit, but a short essay is not the vehicle to make that determination. Simply pointing to a few high-profile PLAYING WELL WITH OTHERS overrulings, as critics sometimes do, proves little. 4 Rather, an indepth examination of the issue requires considering the situations where the overruling dog did not bark-that is, where the Court could have overruled a prior case but declined to do so. 5 Such an investigation also calls for both historical perspective and nuance. 6 Reaching interesting conclusions about the Roberts Court's treatment of stare decisis requires that we identify a baseline of how previous Courts have treated that principle. If impressionistic conclusions based on a few dramatic examples are enough to consider the charge proven, then the Rehnquist 7 and Warren 8 Courts are presumably guilty also.
Moreover, not all overrulings are created equal. Determining the extent of the Roberts Court's alleged disregard of precedent also requires considering the importance of the precedents the Court has in fact rejected. Consider Justice White's dissent in INS v. Chadha. 9 White characterized the majority's rejection of the legislative veto as effectively striking down hundreds of statutes and eliminating a then-major feature of the modern administrative state.' 0 Chadha was not a case where the Court overruled precedent. Justice White's complaint about the farreaching nature of the Court's decision, however, reminds us that identifying judicial aggressiveness, whatever its form, requires See, e.g ., Tom Goldstein, Everything You Read About the Supreme Court is Wrong (Updated), ScoTUsBLOG (June 30, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/everyt hing-you-read-about-the-supreme-court-is-wrong/#more-22491 (noting that "generalizations are often misleading or outright wrong'). 5 See, e. more than simply adding up the number of cases where the Court has acted aggressively." This Essay considers the Roberts Court and stare decisis from a different angle. It examines several methods by which Chief Justice Roberts arguably has used the multi-judge nature of the Supreme Court to his advantage in undermining precedent without explicitly calling for its overruling.1 2 These examples do not prove that the Court as a whole, or the Chief Justice in particular, is bent on undoing the work of prior Courts. Instead, they illustrate the ways in which a Justice can work within the formal confines of precedent to achieve fundamentally different results, either in the short or long term.' 3 The methods described below depend in part on the distinction between the result a court reaches in a case and the reasoning it employs. The nature of the Supreme Court as a multi-judge court makes this distinction possible: often times, the Court may agree on a result but split sharply on its reasoning. 4 This opens up room for a creative Justice to undermine precedent, even as the Justice expresses reasons that appear moderate-in particular, more moderate than those who are more inclined to overrule explicitly. In so doing, the Justice may create the conditions for the ultimate rejection of that precedent, even while publicly counseling restraint-indeed, even while voting to uphold that 11 See Kerr, supra note 6, at 32 (describing varied manifestations of judicial activism). [Vol. 46:1059 precedent.' 5 In short, this Essay considers methods by which Justices can play well with others-both those that came before (via respect for stare decisis) and current colleagues (by strategically positioning themselves among them)-and still achieve their ultimate goal. 16 This Essay situates itself at the intersection of two ongoing debates about judicial behavior. The first examines the concept of stealth overruling-the practice of limiting or even eviscerating a precedent while ostensibly remaining faithful to it.'7 This phenomenon has become a major topic of scholarly discussion during the last five years, 8 as scholars have identified and analyzed examples of the Roberts Court engaging in such conduct-conduct generally thought to have resulted from the replacement of a sometimes centrist Justice O'Connor with a more reliably conservative Justice Alito.' 9 The examples in this Essay illustrate instances where the Court or a plurality thereof arguably has engaged in such conduct. 20 The lessons one can draw from these examples will help shape an understanding of the stealth overruling phenomenon, and the extent to which the Roberts Court performs it.
Second, this Essay engages the debate about the implications of the Supreme Court's character as a collegial body. Scholars long have acknowledged that critiques of the Court must account for its collegial nature rather than simply treating it as a purposive 15 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that stealth overruling allows Justices to overrule precedent without "arousing negative public opinion"). 16 individual. 2 1 This Essay contributes to that debate by considering how Chief Justice Roberts may in certain cases strategically use his colleagues' calls for more explicit overruling of precedent as a tool in maintaining his and the Court's reputation as faithful to stare decisis while nevertheless pushing the law away from precedents.
In essence, this Essay considers how the practice of stealth overruling may be influenced by the Court's multi-judge nature. It therefore contributes to the ongoing debates about both the general implications of the Court's collegial character and the practice of stealth overruling.
Nothing in this Essay is intended to suggest that Chief Justice Roberts is in fact pursuing a strategy of stealth overruling or manipulating his position on a multi-member court. A judge's subjective motives are exceptionally difficult to discern, and to make confident assessments of what a Justice or a Court is doing requires far deeper investigation than this short space will permit. Instead, the examples below merely illustrate the strategies a judge in Chief Justice Roberts's position can employ. 22 Still, the extent to which one finds the Chief Justice engaging in the strategies sketched below might serve as circumstantial evidence of his ultimate motives. More generally, identifying the methods illustrated below may assist in the larger project of assessing whether the Roberts Court is guilty as charged of engaging in these tactics. Finally, as stated earlier, this investigation helps illuminate how the multi-judge nature of the Court opens up such possibilities for "playing well" while still winning. 21 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 804 (1982) ("[The Justices believe that a show of agreement is beneficial to the institution ... and collegial work and compromise are essential to the ability of the Justices to agree.'); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 16, at 99 n.24 (recognizing the collegiality of the Court as a significant factor in granting or denying certiorari, and in deliberations concerning an accepted case); see also Friedman, supra note 11, at 32-33 (considering whether the value of collegial decision making justifies the Court's practice of stealth overruling).
22 This Essay does not address whether Chief Justice Roberts's formal position as leader of the Court provides him with additional means of accomplishing this goal. Further study likely should continue on this subject. See infra Part VII (suggesting further areas for study).
II. WINNING BY LOSING
One way to subtly push law away from current precedent is to concede the likely error of that precedent but conclude that prudential factors counsel against overruling-at least right away. Chief Justice Roberts used this method in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 23 a case that considered the question of when in the criminal justice process the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 24 Justice Souter, writing for eight Justices, concluded that the right attaches when defendants first appear before a judicial officer, they learn of the charge against them, and their liberty is subject to restriction. 25 He based this conclusion on analysis of Supreme Court precedent as well as the practice of the vast majority of states to provide criminal defense counsel at approximately that point in the process. 26 Justice Thomas dissented. 27 He concluded that the original understanding of the term "criminal prosecutions" as used in the Sixth Amendment referred to the "filing [of] formal charges in a court with jurisdiction to try and punish the defendant." 28 He dismissed the Supreme Court precedents relied on by the majority as not fully reasoned and providing only dicta on the precise issue before the Court. 29 So far this description presents a fairly standard story of a modern Supreme Court constitutional case: one opinion relies on precedent while another discounts the significance of the precedent and uses originalist analysis to reach a different conclusion. What is interesting for this Essay is Chief Justice Roberts's separate concurrence, particularly the first paragraph of his brief, two-paragraph opinion: "Justice Thomas's analysis of the present issue is compelling, but I believe the result here is In one sense, the Chief Justice's approach is a paragon of modesty: even if a precedent is wrong-as he suggested 31 -the wiser course is not to revisit it unless "a sufficient case" has been made for doing so. 32 Still, one can be forgiven for being suspicious. Rather than simply finding an insufficient case to overrule, Chief Justice Roberts all but stated that the dissent was correct but that other, presumably prudential, reasons counseled against applying that "compelling" 33 understanding of the law. With one stroke, the Chief Justice both reaffirmed and undermined precedent. 34 Will this approach have a material effect on the Rothgery rule? Predictions, of course, are hazardous. But it seems plausible that the Chief Justice's concurrence, by announcing that Rothgery was correct only by dint of stare decisis rather than its intrinsic merit, will place more pressure on the rule. Surely it suggests a view 30 Id. at 213. 31 The Chief Justice's concurrence can be read more charitably: On the merits he did not believe the precedents supporting the Rothgery majority opinion to be wrong. This seems unlikely, however, unless those precedents and Justice Thomas's "compelling" analysis of "the present issue" are somehow both right in the Chief Justice's mind. Id. Thanks to Nelson Tebbe for suggesting this possibility. 33 Id. at 213. 34 One might compare this approach to that taken by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in their joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In that case, in the course of reaffirming what those Justices called "the essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, id. at 846, the authors hedged on their views as to Roe's correctness. Id. at 853 ("While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf of the State in the case before us, arguments which in their ultimate formulation conclude that Roe should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by... the force of stare decisis[, among other factors]."). Of course, two of the three authors already had expressed their discomfort-to put it mildly-with Roe. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joining in the judgment) (modifying and narrowing Roe's reach); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (warning that the "Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with itself'). But that is exactly the point. Rather than openly disagree with a precedent they were reaffirming for reasons of stare decisis, they instead demurred, even though two of the authors' views on the underlying precedent were already more than an open secret. By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence in Rothgery nearly explicitly embraced the dissent.
that Rothgery and its precedent cases should not be expanded. If such a view attracts additional adherents, the accumulation of precedents refusing to extend Rothgery to new circumstances inevitably will raise the question whether those new cases effectively have overruled the old ones or, at the very least, have eroded them to the point of rendering stare decisis a less weighty consideration when deciding whether to overrule them.
This would be a long-term process. But when Justice Thomas's analysis could not attract five votes, such incremental undermining may have been the most efficient use of the Chief Justice's prestige, especially given his desire to avoid being seen as aggressively calling for the overruling of precedent. 35 Indeed, as suggested above, the combination of his overt attack on the correctness of the majority's reasoning and his adoption of it only as a matter of stare decisis presumably increases his credibility as a modest jurist. 36 At the same time, his strategy invites future litigants to suggest cabining the Rothgery precedent, thereby isolating and ultimately undermining it.
If this dynamic eventually leads to a situation where Rothgery is not extended, and thus evolves into an aberration, then the way would be clear for the Chief Justice to justify overruling in pursuit of the larger doctrinal coherence he openly has elevated, at least in some cases, over stare decisis. 37 3 See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 3, at 158. 36 Another example of Chief Justice Roberts claiming credibility as a modest jurist can be seen in his concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010), which was devoted to the stare decisis issues implicated in the Court's decision to overrule Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and part of McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). In his defense of the Court's decision, Chief Justice Roberts cited the Court's decision, the previous term, to refrain from striking down the Voting Rights Act in favor of adopting a more limited reading of the statute that provided relief to the plaintiff. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009)). One can read the Chief Justice's Citizens United concurrence as arguing that the Court's approach in NAMUDNO demonstrates that the current Court does not instinctively adopt the most extreme approach to deciding cases. 37 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917, 920-21 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("We must balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them decided right."); id. at 921 ("Abrogating the errant precedent, rather than reaffirming or extending it, might better preserve the law's coherence and curtail the III. WINNING ONE CASE AT A TIME As exemplified in Rothgery, one approach for a Justice inclined to undermine precedent without doing so explicitly is to concede the correctness of the revisionist view while counseling prudence. Another way, at least in some cases, is to respect precedent governing the facial constitutionality of a statute but to interpret it so that it does little practical work. Chief Justice Roberts adopted such an approach in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL I1).38 WRTL H considered an as-applied challenge to section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. Section 203 restricts corporations' and unions' use of their general treasury funds to pay for political advertisements immediately before elections if those ads could be understood as appeals to vote for or against a particular electoral candidate. 39 In the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC, 40 the Court upheld the facial validity of section 203 against a First Amendment challenge. 4 1 After McConnell, and prior to WRTL II, however, the Court held that would-be speakers could mount as-applied challenges to section 203.42 WRTL II considered such an as-applied challenge and sustained it on a 5-to-4 vote. 43 protected speech, 52 the Chief Justice's analysis arguably included a built-in self-destruct button that eventually could have brought down section 203 as part of the collateral damage. Justice Scalia argued that the Chief Justice's interpretation of Section 203 would impermissibly chill speech. 53 Justice Alito recognized this in his own concurring opinion, in which he all but invited a facial challenge to section 203 as newly interpreted. 54 In embracing an interpretation that experience may have proved to be unworkable, 55 thus requiring reconsideration of section 203's facial validity, Chief Justice Roberts arguably started the timer on that self-destruct button. 56 As with Rothgery, the picture presented to the world was of a careful, prudent treatment of precedent in contrast to other Justices' more explicit call for overruling. But again as with Rothgery, the Chief Justice's approach all but invited attack on that precedent.
Of course, we know now how the story turned out. In Citizens United the Court declined to rely on narrower grounds to vindicate what even the dissent called the group's "substantial" First Amendment challenge. 57 Rather, it simply overruled McConnell and the precedent on which it relied. 58 In essence, if the Chief Justice did intend to insert a time bomb in WRTL II, the bomb 52 Justice Scalia made this argument. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483, 492-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
53 Id. 5 Id. at 482-83 (Alito, J., concurring). This type of opinion can be understood as a species of the "invitations to overrule" Professor Rick Hasen identifies as one of the ways Justices can move the law without doing so explicitly. Hasen, supra note 12, at 6. ss The locution "may have proved" is required because, as events developed, the Court moved forthrightly to confront McConnell. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 56 The metaphor of a "self-destruct button" or "time bomb" as used here is distinct from Hasen's. Hasen, supra note 12, at 10-12 (explaining his concept of "time bombs" as seemingly innocuous language in an opinion that later can be used to move the law in the author's desired direction). For another take on the same basic idea-that WRTL II created a system that was likely to fail constitutional requirements, thus setting the stage for striking down the entire system-see Friedman, supra note 11, at 31-32 (explaining how in Citizens United the Court noted the complexity of the FEC's regulations as a factor in striking down the underlying statute even though the FEC's rules arose in response to the Court's WRTL II analysis). At another point in the oral argument Chief Justice Roberts was even more abrupt. Much of the discussion of precedent had centered on whether the Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 66 had stated that elections were sufficiently different from referendums with regard to their potential for corruption that Congress could regulate corporate contributions to influence the former, even if it could not restrict contributions to referendum campaigns. 67 MR. OLSON: That -that is -that's the point I'm trying to make. JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't mind citing that. Bellotti didn't decide that.
MR. OLSON: What
Bellotti also said is -and I think this is also in many decisions of this Court -the inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now that we've cleared up that Bellotti didn't decide the question, what is the distinction that -why don't you think that distinction makes sense?69
With Justice Scalia's assistance, Chief Justice Roberts effectively shut down the discussion about whether Bellotti had decided Congress's authority to regulate corporate spending on electoral campaigns. Having dispensed with the possibility of precedent constraining his choice, the Chief Justice was ready, as the last few words of the excerpt indicate, to argue against such restrictions.
Though one should not make too much of oral arguments, one can sometimes discern Justices' thought processes as they work through a series of questions with an advocate. 70 Here, one gets the 69 Oral Argument, supra note 64, at 16-18 (emphasis added). 70 See Hasen, supra note 65 (basing conclusions of how each Justice would vote on the oral argument questions). sense that the Chief Justice was working his way through unfavorable precedent by either cornering the advocate into a position where the precedent does not stand in his way 7 1 or simply by decreeing the dispute about precedent to be settled in his favor. 72 In Citizens United, the Chief Justice's plantings bore fruit in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court. Justice Kennedy relied on the first of these exchanges to undermine Austin. 73 In addition, the opinion tracked the view of Bellotti's key footnote in the way proposed by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts in the second of these exchanges. 74 Thus, one can see the oral argument questioning as potentially aimed at pointing the way for a colleague's later analysis expressly discrediting undesirable precedent.75
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' VOTES AND THE

LIMITS OF INDIRECTION: THE FATE OF FLAST V. COHEN
Rothgery and WRTL II suggest how a Justice inclined to surreptitiously undermine precedent can do so by exploiting the distinction between results and rationales. 76 Ultimately, however, the success of any such strategy requires support-or at least acquiescence-from four other Justices. This basic fact is reflected in two recent cases considering how broadly to read the Court's limited allowance of taxpayer standing in Flast v. Cohen: 77 
A. HEIN
In Hein, a five-Justice majority held that a plaintiff suing as a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge Executive Branch actions that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause. 80 In so doing, Hein refused to apply Flast's Establishment Clause exception to the rule against taxpayer standing. 8 ' However, the Court split sharply in its reasoning. Writing the lead opinion for a plurality of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito agreed that the plaintiff lacked standing. 82 He merely distinguished Flast, however; he did not overrule it.83 Justice Alito concluded that Flast controlled only when the plaintiff challenged a direct congressional appropriation of money for the activity alleged to constitute a religious establishment, as opposed to the general congressional appropriation for Executive Branch activities challenged in Hein.8
As with the Chief Justice's reading of McConnell in WRTL 11,85 Justice Alito's constitutional analysis in Hein attracted fire from both sides. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 86 He also agreed, however, with the four dissenters that Flast controlled the plaintiffs' standing claim. 87 Unlike the dissenters, though, he would have overruled Flast. 88 Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Souter would have reaffirmed Mast and applied it to the Hein plaintiffs' claim. 89 But both he and Justice Scalia agreed in their critique of Justice Alito's attempt to distinguish Flast. 8 551 U.S. at 593 (plurality opinion); id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 81 Id. at 593 (plurality opinion). 82 Id. at 592-93. 83 Id. at 603-05. 84 What Hein adds to this Essay's discussion of precedent and multi-judge court dynamics is the importance of an individual Justice's views-in this case, the views of Justice Kennedy. In Hein, Kennedy performed his well-known role as the swing Justice by joining Justice Alito's plurality opinion 90 but also writing separately. 9 ' In a crucial departure from Justice Alito's analysis, Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that he agreed with Flast. 9 2 Thus, five Justices in Hein-Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters 93 -explicitly reaffirmed the precedent case.
Justice Kennedy's actions in Hein remind us that as much as the results/rationale distinction allows for the incremental undermining of precedent, creativity has its limits. In Hein, Justice Alito did everything right if his goal was to perform the same maneuver that Chief Justice Roberts performed in Rothgery and WRTL II.9 He wrote what seems to be a moderate, cautious opinion, and refused the temptation to join Justice Scalia in calling for Flast's overruling. He used the language of restraint; indeed, he even went further than Chief Justice Roberts did in Rothgery 95 to avoid criticizing the opinion he was declining to overrule. 96 Notably, he discussed the separation of powers facet of the issue that Justice Kennedy focused on in his concurrence. 97 Indeed, Justice Alito's placement of this argument toward the end of his own case in chief 98 and its arguably odd fit in the flow of his analysis suggest that the argument might have been inserted to address Justice Kennedy's concerns.
9o Id. at 593 (plurality opinion). 91 Id. at 615 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 92 Id. at 616 ("In my view the result reached in Flast is correct and should not be called into question.").
93 Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) . 94 See supra Parts II-Ill.
95 See supra Part II. 96 551 U.S. at 614 (plurality opinion) ("Over the years, Flast has been defended by some and criticized by others. But the present case does not require us to reconsider that precedent"). 9 See id. at 611-12 (noting "serious separation-of-powers concerns"); id. at 615-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98 By "case-in-chief," I simply mean Justice Alito's own analysis, which he offered before considering (and rejecting) the lower courts' and the plaintiffs' arguments in favor of applying Flast.
Nevertheless, none of this was enough to convince Justice Kennedy to remain agnostic as to Fast. Instead, Justice Kennedy explicitly agreed with the four dissenters in reaffirming Mast's correctness, and thereby frustrated most of the work Justice Alito's opinion might have accomplished in gradually undermining it as precedent. 99 This fact suggests that artful writing and concealed self-destruct buttons, even when combined with professions of caution and respect for precedent, cannot stop a Justice from simply stating his own view of the law as Justice Kennedy did when he reaffirmed Fast. When that Justice is the fifth vote for reaffirming a precedent, no amount of artfulness can overcome the brute force of what Justice Brennan called "the rule of five." 00 The fundamental independence of each Justice therefore stands as a limit on any Justice's-even a clever Chief Justice'sattempts to subtly push law where four of his colleagues do not want it to go. Thus, a Justice's ability to undermine precedent turns only partly on creative drafting; in addition, it turns on the preferences of the other Justices, and in most high-profile cases, on Justice Kennedy in particular.
B. WINN
If more proof was needed of the last statement, the Court provided it in 2011 in yet another case cutting back on Flast. In Winn, the Court held that a plaintiff taxpayer lacked standing under Mast to challenge Arizona's provision of tax credits for contributions to organizations that provided scholarships to religious schools.' 0 ' While Winn essentially featured the same 99 Id. at 616; id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting). To the extent the very result in Hein comes to be seen as inconsistent with Flast, Hein may still end up undermining Flast. But Justice Kennedy's explicit approval of Flast presumably will slow that process down.
100 Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 763 (1995); see also Friedman, supra note 11, at 32-33 ('The 'committee' explanation [i.e., the fact that the Court is a multi-judge body] does not justify stealth overruling . .. because in each case it is possible to separate the Court majority into the actions of individual Justices. Each Justice has a choice: either vote to overrule explicitly or not. In any given case, the question is whether an individual Justice's decision to overrule by stealth was appropriate."). voting lineup as Hein,1 02 the majority was not as fractured. In Winn, all the Justices voting to deny standing joined the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy. 03 Justice Kennedy distinguished, for standing purposes, between the Arizona tax credit and the direct government appropriation that Flast allowed a taxpayer to challenge.1 04 According to him, the difference between a tax credit and a direct appropriation mattered for standing purposes because the underlying Establishment Clause principle vindicated by "Flast standing" centered on government exactions from citizens to fund religion, which is absent in a tax credit provision. 05 Justice Kennedy signaled early on his intent to distinguish Mast. Immediately after citing that case, he hastened to "note[] at the outset" that "Flast's holding provides a 'narrow exception' to 'the general rule against taxpayer standing.' "106
For the purposes of this Essay, the important part of Justice Kennedy's analysis is his treatment of precedent. Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Kagan argued that the majority's analysis effectively overruled five Supreme Court cases in which the Court had proceeded to the merits of a taxpayer's Establishment Clause suit.1 07 In response to Justice Kennedy's argument that the Court should not be bound by resolutions of issues (such as standing) that it did not explicitly address, 08 Justice Kagan argued that those five opinions should not be understood as having left the standing issue undecided. 09 She pointed out that the Court subsequently cited some of those cases as authority for standing 102 Id. at 1439. In Winn, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan had replaced, respectively, Justices Souter and Stevens but voted in the same way as their predecessors. Id. 103 Id. 1" Id. at 1447.
10 Id.
10 Id. at 1445 (internal citations omitted). 107 Id. at 1453-54 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court did not question the litigants' standing in any of these five prior cases "filed by taxpayers alleging that tax expenditures unlawfully subsidized religion"). doctrine.o 10 Justice Kagan also questioned the credibility of any claim that the Court was unaware of the standing issues in those cases, noting that amici in each of those five cases (including the U.S. Government) had suggested a lack of standing"' and further pointing out that the Court decided three of those cases within a year of deciding another important taxpayer standing case.11 2 She also reversed the majority's presumption about the force of an implicit jurisdictional decision, arguing that "the Court should not 'disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for over 40 years.' "113
Regardless of the ultimate merits of Justice Kagan's allegation that the majority misused precedent, one can still question the breeziness with which Justice Kennedy pushed past those cases. If nothing else, reasoned decision making would seem to demand a more thoughtful and specific response to Justice Kagan's criticisms. dissenting opinions1 16 and made some heroic assumptions in characterizing prohibitions on identity-based speech restrictions as a well-established First Amendment rule. 11 7 He also worked hard to force empirical reality to conform to his constitutional vision, asserting, without support, that unlimited corporate expenditures would not cause the electorate to lose faith in democracy.11 8 As scholars have observed, the coherence Justice Kennedy labored so hard to create is a fragile one."1 9 Does free speech protection extend to expenditures by foreigners? It is hard to see why not. Under Justice Kennedy's view, more speech simply makes for a more informed electorate and disclosure rules allow citizens to discount speech if they distrust the source.1 20 Does free speech protection extend to expenditures made on behalf of judicial candidates? Apparently it does, even though the Courtled by Justice Kennedy himself-held the previous year that the resulting perception of bias was so great that due process required a judge to recuse himself from a case involving a large supporter.121 These issues will have to be resolved in the future. 118 Id. at 909-10. Apparently Justice Kennedy did not fully believe this a year before when he wrote a majority opinion holding that a supporter's independent expenditures on behalf of an elected state court judge could so taint the perception of the judge's fairness in a case involving the supporter that due process required the judge to recuse himself. treatment of pre-Buckley precedent and breezy rejection of the Caperton appearance of corruption concern in Citizens United fit within that pattern of supremely confident adjudication. Chief Justice Roberts, meanwhile, pledges humility and respect for precedent. 129 It is noteworthy therefore that in a high-stakes case like Citizens United Chief Justice Roberts justified his vote to overrule precedent in part on the same basic concern as that expressed by Justice Kennedy.
Of course, a Justice can be humble and respect stare decisis while still voting to overrule precedent.
Certainly, nobody suggests that stare decisis should pose an absolute bar to reconsidering precedent. As one continues to watch Chief Justice Roberts, however, it will be interesting to see the degree to which he expresses a preference for doctrinal coherence over doctrinal stability. More to the particular point of this Essay, it will be interesting to track the relationship between that preference and his proven intuition to move incrementally but tactically, with an eye toward using his colleagues' more forthright tendencies to his advantage. In Rothgery, for instance, his preference for large-scale coherence based on an originalist approach to the issue may have given way to his incrementalist intuitions, especially in light of the fact that there appeared to be no reasonable chance of Justice Thomas's more radical approach prevailing. 30 In WRTL II any preference he had for large-scale coherence based on a strong reading of the First Amendment arguably worked in tandem with Justice Scalia's forthright call for overruling McConnell.131 By resisting that call, Chief Justice Roberts may have preserved his legitimacy as a judge committed to precedent while still setting the stage for McConnell's ultimate demise.1 32 In Citizens United, which squarely raised the question about whether to reaffirm McConnell," 3 the Chief Justice allowed his large-scale aspirations to surface.
These readings of the Chief Justice's actions are necessarily speculative, but they provide focal points for scholars' continued evaluation of his approach both to precedent and to his colleagues. During the course of what is likely to be a long tenure as Chief Justice, he surely will have many opportunities to use one to affect the other.
VII. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this Essay suggest a few preliminary conclusions about how a Justice intent on stealth overruling can make use of the Court's multi-judge character. First, as scholars have noted, oral argument provides at least some opportunity for a Justice to make arguments-including those related to precedent-that other Justices can pick up on in their opinions.1 34 Chief Justice Roberts's questioning of the Solicitor General in the Citizens United reargument created opportunities for Justice Kennedy to deny the role that precedent otherwise might have played."a 5 Skillful questioning of the sort performed by the Chief Justice regarding the meaning of the key footnote in Bellotti, combined with his declaration that the matter was closed, 36 surely provided an additional rhetorical tool available to Justice Kennedy when he set about to explain why Bellotti did not implicitly authorize restrictions on corporate speech in electoral campaigns. 3 7 Second, the existence of more aggressive-or perhaps simply more forthright--colleagues opens up a space for a Justice to 133 But see supra note 61 (noting that narrower grounds were available for the Court to decide the issue in favor of the speaker). 134 undermine a precedent while publicly resisting those colleagues' calls for its explicit overruling. 38 Third, a Justice seeking to undermine precedent may do so by reaffirming the precedent but also inserting a self-destruct button that would pave the way for a future Court to conclude that the precedent cannot be squared with basic constitutional requirements. 3 9 Any surreptitious undermining a Justice may wish to perform via this or the other methods, however, remains subject to the fifth Justice's power to thwart these attacks by explicitly reaffirming the precedent.1 40 These tentative conclusions raise some interesting follow-on insights as well as questions that need further investigation. For example, consider the second of these conclusions, which focuses on a Justice's ability to leverage colleagues' more forthright calls for overruling by adopting a seemingly moderate stance that nevertheless undermines the precedent in question.
Is it appropriate for a Justice to state in an opinion that a precedent likely is wrong but still to adhere to it anyway because of stare decisis? Or does stare decisis carry with it an implicit gag rule, at least on bald statements that the precedent is wrong? This question requires a deeper investigation about the audiences for Court opinions,141 the effects of such statements, and the public's requirements of opinions in terms of frankness and adherence to precedent the Justice honestly believes is wrong.1 42 With regard to the third conclusion, is it appropriate for Justices to preserve a precedent-even one they do not like-by interpreting it to require a test that would likely fail to pass constitutional muster? In other words, are self-destruct buttons cynical ploys to let a precedent die a somewhat slower, agonized, 138 See supra Part I (discussing Rothgery); supra Part II (discussing WRTL 11). 139 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 140 See supra Part IV.A (discussing Hein). 141 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11, at 41-62 (discussing the concept of "acoustic separation"-i.e., the idea that opinions may be heard and understood in different ways by different audiences-and the possibility that stealth overruling is a species of the Court's attempt to send different messages to different audiences). 142 One of the factors that surely would be relevant here is whether the precedent relates to a constitutional or statutory question. Conventional wisdom holds that statutory stare decisis should be firmer given Congress's ability to reverse a statutory interpretation with which it disagrees by amending the underlying statute. but still inevitable death, or are they legitimate attempts to honor stare decisis as much as possible? This question probably cannot be answered in the abstract; rather, it requires assumptions about at least the Justice's good faith in preserving the shell of the precedent and the likelihood that this preservative analysis could in fact survive over the long term.
Finally, questions about the power of the fifth Justice in any would-be majority bring us back full circle to the individual Justice's conduct with regard to stealth overruling. The example illustrating this last point-Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Hein1 4 3 -throws this uncertainty into sharp relief. While Justice Kennedy played a key role-indeed, the key role-in preserving Flast, his opinion nevertheless undermined Flast, at least partially, by embracing a distinction that is hard to take seriously.1 44 The ultimate result-a reaffirmed precedent now limited in an arguably unprincipled way-is in many ways the worst of all possible worlds for a Court committed to principled explanation of its results.14 5 Understanding this dynamic simply returns us to questions about the appropriateness of such arguably unprincipled judicial action. But viewing it in the context of Hein-in which one Justice single-handedly was responsible for creating this state of affairsreveals how important a single Justice's view can be when the Court considers its predecessors' handiwork.
In sum, then, individual Justices' conduct regarding precedent does matter. In particular, on a multi-judge court like the Supreme Court, it matters in the context of their colleagues' approach to the particular precedential issues before them. Therefore, it matters how individual Justices go about navigating not just their own attitudes about stare decisis but also how they us See supra Part V.A. 144 See supra Part V.A. 145 In this sense it is ironic that the Justice who single-handedly created this situation in Hein-Justice Kennedy-is the one who has perhaps waxed most rhapsodic about the importance of the judicial role. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking down a statute limiting the ability of federally funded legal aid lawyers to raise certain legal arguments in litigation on the ground that it interfered with courts' ability to perform their core function).
